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ABSTRACT Managing employees and external partners effectively has been a primary concern 
for organizations and their managers. Many studies have investigated the effectiveness of 
organizational controls in a wide variety of contexts. Using organizational controls literature 
that discriminates among outcome, behaviour, and clan control, this study synthesizes the research 
on the effectiveness of these controls. In particular, the study examines 23,839 organizational 
controls–performance relationships from 120 independent samples, and tests several new 
hypotheses using advanced meta-analytic methods. The results indicate that outcome, behav-
iour, and clan controls generally enhance performance, with each control having a distinct 
performance effect. Our analysis also demonstrates that controls function as complements to 
one another. This finding indicates that one form of control increases the effectiveness of other 
forms of control. We also examine the organizational controls–performance relationships 
across various contexts, and our results show that they vary according to the type of task. The 
paper concludes with a discussion on the theoretical and managerial implications of these 
findings.
Keywords: complementarity, inter-organizational, level of analysis, meta-analysis, 
organizational controls, task type
INTRODUCTION
Organizational controls are ‘integral to the way in which organizations function’ 
(Cardinal et al., 2010, p. 51). They are exercised by controllers (e.g., project managers, 
client firms, business unit heads) over controllees (e.g., project team members, suppliers, 
business unit members). Controls are defined as any process through which controllers 
motivate and direct controllees to behave in ways that are aligned with the control-
lers’ objectives (Cardinal et al., 2010; Kirsch, 2004). In the absence of organizational 
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controls, or when controls are used inappropriately, controllees are assumed to act in 
ways that favour their own interests and objectives that are not necessarily in line with 
the controllers’ objectives (Eisenhardt, 1989).
The organizational controls literature specifies three prototypical types of  control: out-
come, behaviour, and clan (Ouchi, 1979; Turner and Makhija, 2006). Outcome and 
behaviour controls focus on the specification and evaluation of  desired task outcomes 
and behaviours. Clan controls involve socialization and input (e.g., selection and training) 
mechanisms for influencing controllees’ behaviour (Cardinal et al., 2010; Kirsch, 1996). 
A growing body of  research on organizational controls has investigated how organiza-
tional controls shape performance in various empirical settings. These studies generally 
assert that controls increase performance, as they limit the extent to which controllees 
act in their own self-interest and behave opportunistically (Ouchi, 1979). However, two 
issues still remain that need to be addressed to advance our understanding of  the organi-
zational controls-performance landscape.
First, the empirical evidence for the assertion that organizational controls increase 
performance remains equivocal (Cardinal et al., 2017). Some studies report that controls 
have a positive effect on performance (e.g., Liu, 2015), while other studies report that 
they are ineffective (Tiwana and Keil, 2007). Specifically, there have been contradictory 
findings in previous studies as to how outcome, behaviour, and clan controls affect per-
formance. For instance, several studies have reported that outcome control has a posi-
tive effect on performance (e.g., Liu, 2015; Tiwana, 2008), whereas other studies have 
found that the effect of  outcome control on performance is insignificant or negative (e.g., 
Aulakh et al., 1996; Bonner et al., 2002). Similarly, mixed findings exist with regard to 
the effects of  behavior and clan controls (e.g., Aulakh and Gencturk, 2000; Bello and 
Gilliland, 1997; Bonner et al., 2002; Tiwana, 2010; Tiwana and Keil, 2009). Therefore, 
additional empirical evidence is necessary to understand whether and to what extent 
organizational controls are related to performance.
 Second, the performance effect of  one control may depend on its interplay with an-
other control. Some researchers have taken a singular view of  control and suggest the use 
of  single form of  control over another to achieve the desired performance (Cardinal et 
al., 2017) – for example, behavior control rather than outcome control or clan control 
rather than behaviour control. In other words, researchers have historically advocated 
that different controls function as substitutes, and that using one type of  control decreases 
the effectiveness of  the others (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1979). Contemporary re-
searchers have taken a holistic view of  control and advocate that different controls jointly 
influence performance. Specifically, what these researchers have suggested is that the 
different controls function as complements, and that exercising one type of  control makes 
the other controls more effective (e.g., Kreutzer et al., 2015; Long et al., 2002). In a 
recent review, Cardinal et al. (2017) also suggested that we still have only a limited un-
derstanding of  control configurations that commonly exist in organizations and how 
different controls combine with each other. From a managerial perspective, achieving the 
desired performance is strongly dependent on the types of  control exercised by managers 
(Cardinal et al., 2017; Kirsch, 1996). The current ambivalent findings on the interplay 
of  outcome, behaviour, and clan controls are likely to confuse managers. Clarification of 
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whether and how different controls interact with each other to improve performance is 
therefore needed.
In sum, the present study addresses two primary research questions: (1) How do or-
ganizational controls affect performance, and (2) Do controls substitute or complement one 
another's effects? To investigate these questions, we need to meta-analyse the organiza-
tional controls–performance relationships found in prior research. Meta-analysis allows 
conflicting empirical findings to be reconciled by calculating effect sizes from existing 
empirical observations using weighted average techniques (Hedges and Olkin, 1985; 
Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). This method not only provides a rigorous assessment of  a 
relationship as it corrects for the distorting effects of  statistical artefacts, but it also facil-
itates theory extension by throwing light on how different controls combine with each 
other with the help of  meta-analytic path analysis (Cao and Lumineau, 2015; Hunter 
and Schmidt, 2004).
This study therefore contributes to current controls research as follows. It provides rig-
orously derived discrete estimates for the three controls–performance relationships. This 
also allows us to assess how much controls matters. Consolidating the relationship be-
tween the three organizational controls and performance across different organizational 
settings provides a broader and more complete picture of  the relationships. Further, since 
meta-analysis helps in addressing open research questions with data that are more proxi-
mate to the general population than those supplied in an individual primary study (Eden, 
2002), this study makes a substantial contribution to the ongoing debate in the organi-
zational controls literature on the interplay among individual controls. By focusing on 
the interplay among the three controls, we are able to move controls research forward 
by providing greater clarity on whether the different types of  control are more or less 
effective when combined.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
Organizational controls are defined as any process through which controllers motivate 
and direct controllees to behave in ways that are aligned with the controllers’ objec-
tives (Cardinal et al., 2010; Turner and Makhija, 2006). The organizational controls 
literature discriminates among three prototypical controls: outcome, behaviour, and clan.1 
Controllers (who exercise control) can use outcome, behaviour, and clan controls to mo-
tivate the controllees (those over whom the control is exercised) to achieve the desired 
performance (Kirsch, 1996; Tiwana, 2008).
Organizational Controls and Performance
Controllers exercising outcome controls specify quantitative performance objectives and 
reward controllees based on the extent to which they achieve those objectives (Cardinal, 
2001; Turner and Makhija, 2006). To exercise outcome control effectively, the control-
ler does not need to understand the process by which inputs are transformed into out-
puts (Kirsch, 1996; Ouchi, 1979). Also, outcome control does not require controllers to 
monitor controllees’ behaviour closely, and controllers can thus save time and resources 
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(Kreutzer et al., 2015). The hands-off approach of outcome control therefore makes it 
an efficient form of control. Some scholars have argued that this hands-off approach 
may also result in a disconnect between controllers and controllees (e.g., Anderson and 
Oliver, 1987; Kreutzer et al., 2015). However, others have argued that the hands-off 
approach allows controllees discretion in terms of how they behave and this can give 
them a greater sense of commitment and engagement (e.g., Snell, 1992). Outcome con-
trol therefore leads to higher performance as it incentivizes controllees and holds them 
accountable for achieving the specified goals. Outcome control also gives controllees 
f lexibility and motivation as it allows them discretion to select their own ways of achiev-
ing the specified goals (Kreutzer et al., 2015).
In outcome control, controllers can review the activities completed by controllees and 
provide feedback so that they can take corrective actions or make further improvements 
(Carbonell and Rodriguez-Escudero, 2013; Liu, 2015). Outcome control therefore en-
ables controllees to deliver efficiently on the requirements specified by the controller. In 
addition, it helps in specifying clear and unambiguous goals and requirements. Control 
researchers have asserted that controllees who are given clear performance goals adopt 
appropriate behaviour to achieve the specified goals (Bonner et al., 2002; Kirsch, 1997). 
This perspective on controls is also supported by path–goal and agency theory that dis-
cuss the positive influence of  setting straightforward goals (Eisenhardt, 1989; House, 
1971). Thus, specifying appropriate goals helps to align controllees’ interests with con-
trollers’ objectives and thus enables the desired performance to be achieved. We there-
fore propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a: Outcome control is positively related to performance.
In behaviour control, controllers emphasize procedures and rules that controllees are 
expected to follow while doing their assigned tasks and they evaluate controllees’ perfor-
mance on how they adhere to the prescribed procedures (Cardinal et al., 2010; Kirsch, 
1996). Different tasks involve a certain level of  ambiguity and complexity that could 
hamper controllees’ ability to finish them on time or within budget. Controllers aim 
to mitigate these inefficiencies by exercising behavior control as they encase controll-
ees’ tasks with standardized development practices. Standardized development methods 
help to reduce errors and ensure consistency in the procedures followed to complete 
tasks (Gopal and Gosain, 2010; Turner and Makhija, 2006). Prescribing specific meth-
odologies and procedures also helps in providing guidance and direction to controllees 
throughout the entire process (Ouchi and Maguire, 1975). Thus, behaviour control im-
proves the consistency of  controllees’ work.
Some scholars have suggested that some controllers do not have sufficient foresight and 
knowledge and thus do not understand fully the process by which inputs are transformed 
into outputs. These controllers may therefore find it difficult to specify effective proce-
dures that controllees need to follow (Hendry, 2002; Kirsch et al., 2002). Also, even with 
the right knowledge of  the transformation process, monitoring controllees’ behaviour 
involves substantial time and cost (Eisenhardt, 1985). Despite these disadvantages, re-
searchers assert that behavior control involves dynamic involvement from controllers as 
 Organizational Controls and Performance Outcomes 5
© 2018 The Authors
Journal of Management Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd and
Society for the Advancement of Management Studies
they need to actively provide input on the behaviours that controllees need to follow in 
order to complete various tasks (Aulakh and Gencturk, 2000). Such active involvement 
signals that the controller is committed to the activity. This not only helps to create an 
active dialogue between controllers and controllees, but also fosters commitment from 
controllees (Atuahene-Gima and Li, 2002; Kreutzer et al., 2015). Thus, behaviour con-
trol motivates controllees to follow the specified procedures and achieve the desired per-
formance. In line with these arguments, we propose that:
Hypothesis 1b: Behaviour control is positively related to performance.
Clan control refers to the mechanisms used by controllers to ensure that controllees em-
brace common values and goals and commit to shared objectives (Cardinal et al., 2010; 
Kirsch et al., 2010).2 Examples of  such mechanisms include socialization approaches 
such as social events, off-site meetings, and casual lunches or dinners (Choudhury and 
Sabherwal, 2003; Kirsch et al., 2010) or input mechanisms such as selection, training, 
and development procedures (Snell and Youndt, 1995). These mechanisms allows beliefs, 
values, and norms to be transmitted by the controller to the controllees. Thus, socializa-
tion mechanisms help in cultivating a common understanding and language between 
them (Kirsch, 1996; Liu, 2015). Shared understanding and values provide a rich, broad 
implicit guide to controllees as to what is considered by the controller to be acceptable 
or deviant behavior without the controller formally monitoring whether controllees are 
adhering to acceptable behaviours (Kirsch et al., 2010). Unlike outcome and behaviour 
control, clan control relies on common values and norms to put pressure on controllees 
to conform to acceptable behaviours (Barker, 1993; Kirsch et al., 2010). As such, clan 
control helps to guide controllees toward actions and behaviours that ensure the desired 
performance is achieved.
Clan control also promotes mutual trust and interests through social interactions 
(Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003; Huang et al., 2005). The increase in positive mutual 
expectations and interests further motivates controllees to commit to their relationship 
with controllers and encourages cooperative behaviour from them (Das and Teng, 2001; 
Sengun and Wasti, 2009). Clan control therefore plays an important role in fostering 
mutual working relationships between controllers and controllees. Past research has 
also shown that shared interests and understanding between controllers and controllees 
lead to improved decision making and on-time completion of  tasks (Choudhury and 
Sabherwal, 2003; Kirsch, 1996). Furthermore, clan control through input approaches 
ensures rigorous selection and training of  controllees (Snell and Youndt, 1995). Through 
training controllees acquire the right knowledge and skills to understand diverse perspec-
tives and internalize the controller's values and goals (Cardinal, 2001; Liao, 2006). In 
sum, clan control facilitates the transmission of  common beliefs, values, and understand-
ing, and these help in achieving the desired performance. We therefore propose that:
Hypothesis 1c: Clan control is positively related to performance.
6 V. Sihag and S. A. Rijsdijk 
© 2018 The Authors
Journal of Management Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd and
Society for the Advancement of Management Studies
Organizational Controls: Substitutes or Complements?
The interplay among the three organizational controls has been a topic of considerable 
debate in the controls literature (Cardinal et al., 2017; Tiwana, 2010). Specifically, exist-
ing research on outcome, behaviour, and clan controls is divided about whether the three 
controls substitute or complement each other in explaining performance. Controls function 
as substitutes when one control reduces the effectiveness of other controls. Conversely, 
they function as complements when one control reinforces the effectiveness of other con-
trols (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995; Siggelkow, 2002; Tiwana, 2010).
Scholars advancing a substitutes perspective take a ‘singular’ approach and have implic-
itly advocated the use of  one form of  control rather than multiple forms (Cardinal et al., 
2017, p. 22). They contend that exercising multiple organizational controls simultane-
ously creates redundancies and inefficiencies, thus weakening the impact of  individual 
controls on performance. For example, Rijsdijk and van den Ende (2011) postulate that 
using clan control and behaviour control as complements is ‘inefficient’, because clan 
control weakens the positive influence of  behaviour control on performance ‘as both 
types of  controls are relatively communication-intensive’ (Rijsdijk and van den Ende, 
2011, p. 876). Clan control can replace behaviour control as both perform the same 
function of  reducing the ambiguity surrounding the behaviours that controllees need to 
follow (Govindarajan and Fisher, 1990). There is therefore no need for one control if  an-
other can be exercised. The simultaneous use of  behaviour and clan control that rely on 
active communication between a controller and a controllee can therefore be inefficient. 
Similarly, Tiwana (2010) posits that exercising clan control with outcome control is not 
beneficial, since the information needed to exercise outcome control effectively can be 
measured reliably without requiring clan control.
Empirical studies have used contingency-based theoretical arguments to emphasize 
the substitute perspective, that is, that only one type of  control is effective in a given con-
text (Cardinal et al., 2017). The contingency view builds on Ouchi's (1979) framework 
where it is argued that outcome control should be exercised when outputs can be clearly 
specified and measured by a controller, and behaviour control should be exercised when 
a controller understands the process required to transform inputs into outputs. When the 
outcomes are not measurable and controllers also do not have sufficient understanding of 
how inputs can be transformed into outputs, clan control is suggested to be an effective 
form of  control.
Scholars have also used other theories and empirical arguments to suggest that differ-
ent forms of  control act as substitutes (e.g., Nidumolu and Subramani, 2003; Tiwana 
and Keil, 2009). Using transaction cost theory as a theoretical foundation, some scholars 
have posited that exercising multiple forms of  control is costly and they advocate the use 
of  one control over the other, based on the costs of  specification, measurement, and eval-
uation. Some other scholars have used agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) to argue that, 
as tasks become more complex and ambiguous, a controller must then exercise behavior 
control instead of  outcome control as controllees are typically risk-averse, and exercising 
outcome control would shift the risk unnecessarily on to the controllees. Scholars have 
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also posited that exercising multiple controls simultaneously can prove counterproduc-
tive as it signals a lack of  trust to controllees, who are thereby encouraged to engage in 
opportunistic and other undesirable behaviours (Aulakh and Gencturk, 2000; Tiwana, 
2010).
In contrast, contemporary scholars who suggest a complements perspective argue for a 
‘holistic’ approach and have focused on understanding how different forms of  control 
jointly influence performance (Cardinal et al., 2017, p. 24). Specifically, they have fo-
cused on blending different types of  control to achieve the desired performance (e.g., 
Cardinal et al., 2004; Long et al., 2002), and have described the singular view of  control 
as problematic because it does not reflect actual controller–controllee settings that are 
often dynamic and complex and involve various forms of  control (Cardinal et al., 2017; 
Kreutzer et al., 2015, 2016). They suggest instead that a holistic approach allows for a 
greater variety of  control and provides a better reflection of  actual controller–controllee 
settings. Therefore, a complements perspective allows us to understand better how the 
combination of  different forms of  control is greater than the sum of  the single control 
mechanisms.
 Empirical studies investigating the complements perspective posit that each control 
addresses the limitations of  the other controls and thereby improves performance. For 
example, Kreutzer et al. (2015) argue that outcome and behaviour controls jointly im-
prove the performance of  strategic organizational initiatives by mitigating one another's 
disadvantages. Similarly, Tiwana (2010) argues that clan controls create an environment 
in which controllees freely share information about specified behaviours and the effec-
tiveness of  behaviour control is thereby increased. Further, the communication between 
controller and controllee while behaviour control is being exercised can also facilitate 
interpersonal relationships between them, and this can establish conditions that are fa-
vourable for effective clan control (Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003; Kirsch, 2004).
 Scholars also argue that exercising outcome and behaviour controls provide extrinsic 
motivation for controllees and that clan controls provide intrinsic motivation by inter-
nalizing group traditions, values, and norms (Kirsch, 1996; Merchant, 1985). Using all 
three types of  control motivates controllees to achieve prescribed outputs and behaviours 
and at the same time reduces their tendency to show ineffective behaviours. Therefore, 
investigating different forms of  control together provides a better understanding of  how 
controllers can manage dynamic, fluid, and complex managerial challenges effectively.
Some scholars argue for a substitutes view in which controls weaken the performance 
effects of  other controls, while other scholars support the complements view in which 
controls strengthen the performance effects of  those other controls. To reflect this lack of 
consensus, we propose two competing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: Outcome, behaviour, and clan controls weaken one another's effects 
on performance.
Hypothesis 2b: Outcome, behaviour, and clan controls strengthen one another's ef-
fects on performance. 
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METHODS
Literature Search and Inclusion Criteria
The objective of our data collection was to identify all studies that investigated orga-
nizational control–performance relationships. To retrieve the relevant studies for the 
meta-analysis, we used the following search strategies. First, we used Boolean combi-
nations of relevant keywords to explore five electronic databases: (1) ABI/INFORM, 
(2) ISI Web of Knowledge, (3) EBSCO, (4) Google Scholar, and (5) JSTOR. The key-
words used were ‘outcome control’, ‘output control’, ‘market control’, ‘results control’, 
‘behaviour control’, ‘process control’, ‘action control’, ‘bureaucratic control’, ‘clan 
control’, ‘cultural control’, ‘social control’, ‘personnel control’, ‘input control’, ‘formal 
control’, and ‘informal control’. We specified no start date and the search included 
studies published up till May 2017. We excluded those studies that included key-
words such as conceptual, case study (or studies), review, or synthesis in their abstract. 
Second, we explored and traced the reference lists of all the studies identified using 
Google Scholar, especially the seminal article by Ouchi (1979) and the review arti-
cle by Cardinal et al. (2017). Third, we searched the proceedings of conferences (e.g., 
Academy of Management Proceedings), Research Gate, and the Open Access Theses 
and Dissertation Database as well as the Research Gate discussion forum and a variety 
of electronic listservs (e.g., AOM's Organization and Management Theory Division) to 
identify unpublished manuscripts.
Four criteria were used to select the studies for our meta-analysis. First, a study had to 
include at least one measure of  any of  the three organizational controls and one mea-
sure of  performance. A common problem faced by meta-analytic researchers is how to 
deal with constructs that are labelled differently but have identical measures and con-
structs that are labelled identically across studies. To address this problem, Lipsey and 
Wilson (2001) suggest defining appropriately the focal constructs and measurements used 
in various studies that make use of  these definitions. Table I summarizes the focal con-
struct definitions that are consistent with prior literature and some of  the representative 
measures.
 Second, studies had to report the sample size and correlations or other statistics (e.g., 
t or F statistics) needed to calculate correlations among the organizational controls 
and performance outcome(s) (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). Third, the unit of  anal-
ysis for the meta-analytic research needed to be the individual sample and not the 
individual effect size (Hedges and Olkin, 1985). Therefore, if  multiple measures of 
one or more controls (e.g., monitoring, directing, evaluating, and rewarding) or one 
or more performance outcomes (e.g., quality and project efficiency) were used in a 
single study, and separate correlations were reported for those measures, the correla-
tions were averaged to calculate a single estimate for the study (Hunter and Schmidt, 
2004). However, if  effect sizes for multiple countries were reported, they were consid-
ered as different samples and were included as individual effect sizes. Fourth, to avoid 
the problem of  conceptual replication (Geyskens et al., 2006) we ascertained that all 
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studies were independent and had no overlapping samples. Our sample contained nine 
sets of  studies that had overlapping samples.3 Thus, we examined these sets of  studies 
for duplication following the detection heuristic provided by Wood (2008). While five 
sets of  studies with duplicate datasets were coded separately as they examined either 
different constructs or measures, two published studies and one PhD dissertation were 
marked as duplicate as four sets of  studies appeared to use similar data, construct, and 
measures.4 Altogether, these procedures yielded 23,893 observations from 120 datasets 
across 108 studies. These studies were based on various levels of  analysis, including 
individual, business unit, and firm, with firm being the most prevalent level of  analysis. 
The 108 studies are reported in Appendix. The literature search and selection process 
are illustrated in Figure 1.
Table I. Definition of study constructs and representative measures
Construct  Definition and representative measures
Outcome Control Construct Definition: Control where the controller specifies performance outputs, 
standards, or goals, and monitors and evaluates controllees’ performance 
relative to those outputs or goals (Cardinal, 2001; Kirsch, 2004).
Representative Measures: Our company establishes specific and clear performance 
objectives for the service provider (Stouthuysen, Slabbinck, and Roodhooft, 
2012); The client placed significant weight on accomplishing project goals 
(Tiwana, 2008).
Behaviour 
Control
Construct Definition: Control where the controller specifies appropriate behaviours, 
explicit procedures, or rules for the controllee, and monitors and evaluates 
controllees based on their performance relative to specified behaviours or 
procedures (Cardinal, 2001; Turner and Makhija, 2006).
Representative Measures: The project followed documented processes for software 
development (Gopal and Gosain, 2010); Upper management specified proce-
dures used by the team (Bonner et al., 2002).
Clan Control Construct Definition: Control where the controller relies upon informal interactions 
to achieve shared values and norms among the controllees, and within the 
group to which they are affiliated. The controller also relies on input mecha-
nisms such as selection and value training to guide and inf luence controllee 
behaviours (Cardinal et al., 2010; Kirsch et al., 2010).
Representative Measures: There was a strong community feeling between myself and 
the team members (Rijsdijk and van den Ende, 2011); we often have social 
meetings where our firm managers and foreign agents interact with each other 
(Aulakh and Gencturk, 2000); Managers received substantial formal training 
(task-related knowledge, e.g., market knowledge) before they assumed responsi-
bility in growth initiatives (Kreutzer et al., 2015).
Performance  Construct Definition: Multi-dimensional measures that include self-reported 
evaluations and archival records of goal accomplishments.
 Representative Measures: Adherence to schedules, overall effectiveness, overall 
efficiency (Tiwana and Keil, 2007); Customer satisfaction, market share, 
profitability (Baldauf et al., 2001b).
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Coding
To code for Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c we obtained three statistics from each study: sam-
ple size, correlation coefficients of the three organizational controls with performance, 
and reliability levels for the three organizational controls and performance. We used 
the composite reliability or Cronbach's alpha to represent reliability. If a study did not 
report one of these two indicators, we used the average reliability to replace the missing 
values (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). If studies reported multiple measures for a construct, 
we averaged the correlations and reliability measures to yield a single estimate and each 
sample is only represented once (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004).
To test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, we also needed correlations among the three organiza-
tional controls. We therefore also obtained the correlations among outcome, behaviour, 
Figure 1. Literature search and selection process
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and clan control measures. Also, controls researchers generally suggest that a large or-
ganization has more means with which to achieve the desired performance (Gencturk 
and Aulakh, 1995; Kreutzer et al., 2015), and firm size is therefore an important control 
variable. To this end, we also obtained correlations of  firm size with the three organiza-
tional controls and performance.
Using the definitions of  three control constructs provided in Table I and focusing also on 
how the control constructs were measured, we categorized the organizational controls of 
the various studies into outcome, behaviour, and clan controls. For example, Menguc and 
Barker (2003) use ‘incentive pay’ as an outcome control. The construct measures the amount 
of  incentives paid to salespeople when they meet performance targets and is in line with the 
definition of  outcome control as described in Table I. Outcome controls included construct 
labels such as output control, results control, outcome-based control, financial control, in-
centive pay, outcome-based incentives, and use of  outcome controls. Behaviour controls 
consisted of  construct labels such as process control, behaviour-based control, action con-
trol, supervisor monitoring, activity control, and capability control. Clan controls covered 
construct labels such as social control, informal control, clan culture, professional control, 
relational governance, and formal and informal socialization mechanisms. Appendix pro-
vides an overview of  the studies used in this meta-analysis and the labels they employed.
We also coded several additional variables that might play a role in determining the 
strength of  the organizational controls–performance relationships. First, the three 
organizational controls may play different roles in enhancing different types of  per-
formance outcome (Cardinal et al., 2017). We therefore coded all the performance 
measures into the four categories of  performance outcome proposed by Quinn and 
Rohrbaugh (1983) and adopted by Cardinal et al. (2017): rational goal, process, adaptabil-
ity, and human relations outcomes. Rational goal outcomes concern efficiency and pro-
ductivity measured in terms of, for example, speed, quality, financial performance, 
and other outcomes that are of  interest to customers, shareholders, and partners. 
Process outcomes concern order, and corresponding measures therefore consider the 
quality of  coordination, cooperation, and information flows. Adaptability focuses on 
the capabilities required for long-term survival, and representative measures include, 
for example, innovation, flexibility, and learning orientation. Human relations out-
comes concern employee wellbeing and growth, and are captured by measures such 
as employee satisfaction, relationship quality, and commitment. For studies that re-
ported several performance outcomes, we obtained all the performance outcomes 
and coded them separately.
Second, we coded the nature of  the performance data used in the individual samples as 
either self-reported or archival. Compared to archival data, self-reported data may cause 
a potential upward bias (Williams et al., 2010). Archival measures often have a lower re-
liability and act as unrefined proxies that are subject to many factors, while self-reported 
perceptual measures tend to be more fine-grained (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 
1986). We therefore coded the performance data variable as self-reported (coded as 0) or 
archival (coded as 1).
Third, researchers have argued that task and outcome information may be more dif-
ficult to transmit in inter-organizational settings than in intra-organizational settings, because 
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in inter-organizational settings the controller and controllees are part of  different or-
ganizations and information has to be transmitted across organizational boundaries 
(Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003; Tiwana and Keil, 2009). We therefore coded whether 
the organizational setting of  a specific study was intra-organizational (coded as ‘0’) or in-
ter-organizational (coded as ‘1’) or both (coded as ‘2’). For example, the study by Kreutzer 
et al. (2015) is coded as ‘0’ as it investigates the management of  strategic initiatives within 
organizations and the controller and controllee are part of  the same organization. The 
study by Wallenburg and Schäffler (2014) is coded as ‘1’ as it focuses on the management 
of  horizontal alliances and the controller and controllee are part of  separate organiza-
tions. The study by Tiwana and Keil (2009) examines the effectiveness of  controls in 
both internal (intra-organizational) and outsourced (inter-organizational) systems devel-
opment projects. The study does not provide correlation coefficients separately for these 
two subsamples and is therefore coded as ‘2’.
Fourth, we coded the nature of  the task being carried out by the controllee as some 
tasks can be more easily specified, observed, and evaluated than others (Govindarajan 
and Fisher, 1990; Kirsch, 1996). We classified each study according to the particular type 
of  task involved (e.g., new product development (NPD), information systems (IS) devel-
opment, sales, human resource management (HRM), etc.) and labelled this variable as 
task type. For instance, a study was coded as NPD when it focused on activities associated 
with identifying and transforming customer needs into new products or as Sales when it 
focused on tasks associated with selling and distribution activities.
Fifth, controls researchers have argued that the level of  analysis is important when 
investigating organizational controls as outcomes, behaviours, and culture vary across or-
ganizational levels (Cardinal, 2001; Ouchi, 1977). As such, we coded the variable level of 
analysis into four main categories: firm (coded as ‘0’), business unit (coded as ‘1’), project 
team (coded as ‘2’), and individual (coded as ‘3’).
Measurement quality is important for meta-analytic research as it involves coding of 
measures based on judgements. (Orwin and Vevea, 2009; Perreault and Leigh, 1989). Each 
study was therefore coded independently by two coders. After data collection, we used 
Perreault and Leigh's (1989) method for calculating the interrater reliability index.5 This 
method provides more accurate estimates of  chance agreement and corrects for problems 
associated with Cohen's kappa as it does not rely on marginal frequencies. The reliability 
index estimates of  the coders ranged from 0.93 to 0.98 for different constructs. Therefore, 
the reliability of  the coding process is more than sufficient. The coding differences were 
resolved through discussion. The resulting data were used for meta-analytic calculations.
Meta-Analytic Procedures
To test Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c, we applied a random-effects model to compute the sam-
ple-size-weighted mean estimates (r) and the reliability-corrected mean estimates (rc) of the 
correlations (r) between organizational controls and performance. We used reliability-cor-
rected mean estimates for interpretation as effect sizes reported in an individual study are 
subject to measurement error (Hedges and Olkin, 1985; Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). We 
used the ‘metafor’ package in R to perform random-effects model analysis using three steps 
(Viechtbauer, 2010). First, Fisher's Zr transformation was used to transform the correlation 
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estimates to minimize skewness in the effect size distribution due to standard error formu-
lation (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). Secondly, each transformed effect size was weighted by its 
inverse variance weight to account for sample-size-related differences in precision (sampling 
error) across effect sizes (Borenstein et al., 2009; Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). The rationale 
is that an effect size obtained from a study with a large sample size offers greater precision 
than an effect size obtained from a study with a small sample size (Ellis, 2006; Hunter and 
Schmidt, 2004). The inverse variance weight was also used to calculate confidence and 
credibility intervals for assessing the significance and distribution of effect sizes respectively 
(Whitener, 1990). Thirdly, the meta-analytic mean was transformed back into the standard 
correlation form for ease of interpretation (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001).
We used Q and I2 statistics to examine the heterogeneity in effect size distribution 
(Hunter and Schmidt, 2004; Sagie and Koslowsky, 1993). The Q statistic tests for 
the existence of  heterogeneity and is calculated by computing the sum of  squared 
deviation of  each study's effect size from the mean effect size and weighting the con-
tribution of  each study by its invariance (Borenstein et al., 2009). The I2 estimates 
indicate the meta-analytic sample and are computed by comparing the Q statistic 
value with its degrees of  freedom (Higgins and Thompson, 2002). In the case of 
heterogeneity, mean effect sizes are best interpreted as an average rather than as a 
common true correlation value, which implies that further moderator analyses are 
required (Hedges and Olkin, 1985).
While estimating the weighted mean effect sizes, we also checked for outliers and publi-
cation bias as both may affect the effect sizes obtained (Borenstein et al., 2009; Viechtbauer 
and Cheung, 2010). We used studentized deleted residuals along with Cook's distances 
and COVRATIO values to identify potential outliers (Viechtbauer and Cheung, 2010). 
These diagnostics measure how excluding the observed effect size of  a particular study 
affects the mean effect size. It is important to note that an outlier model might not have a 
significant impact on the results, and exclusion should only be considered when it brings 
about significant changes in the fitted model. While no outlier was found for clan control, 
one outlier was identified for outcome control and one for behaviour control. However, 
we checked the robustness of  mean effect size estimations by including and excluding the 
outlier correlation coefficients and there was no substantial change in the estimates.
To test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, we used the meta-analytic structural equation modelling 
(MASEM) procedure for path analysis. In this two-stage method (Cao and Lumineau, 
2015; Cheung and Chan, 2005), we first calculated the ten sample sizes and reliabili-
ty-corrected mean correlations among organizational controls, performance, and firm 
size using the random-effects procedure to create a correlation matrix. Since sample size 
varied across the intercorrelations, we used the harmonic mean to calculate the sample 
size required for the second stage (Viswesvaran and Ones, 1995). In the second stage, 
we carried out the path analysis using the correlation matrix as input for the structural 
equation modelling program AMOS.
Testing Hypotheses 2a and 2b required us to assess the complementary vs substitution 
effects on performance of  the three organizational controls: outcome, behaviour, and clan.6 As 
very few studies had reported the interaction terms of  the three organizational controls and 
their relationship to performance, we employed the following method to investigate the joint 
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effects of  the three controls on performance. We simultaneously captured the influence of 
the three organizational controls on performance to see whether they strengthen one an-
other and whether at the same time they have a positive and statistically significant relation-
ship to performance. The three organizational controls will have a complementary effect on 
performance when the total effect of  an individual organizational control on performance 
is greater than the direct effect of  that organizational control (Cao and Lumineau, 2015; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1995). In contrast, for the substitution effect, the total effect of  an 
individual control on performance should be smaller than the direct effect of  that control on 
performance. To compute the total effect of  an organizational control X on performance, 
the path coefficient values between X and the other two controls should be multiplied by 
their respective values of  direct effect on performance. The resulting value is then added to 
the direct effect of  X on performance (Alwin and Hauser, 1975; Cao and Lumineau, 2015).
We also performed supplementary analyses to examine the differential performance 
effects of  the three organizational controls and moderation effects of  the nature of  the 
performance data, organizational setting, task type, and level of  analysis. To estimate 
the effects of  outcome, behaviour, and clan controls on the four performance outcomes 
of  rational goal, adaptability, human relations, and process, we conducted path analy-
ses in AMOS using the reliability-corrected effect-size estimates among them. The es-
timates were computed using the random-effects model analysis described earlier. We 
used Z-tests and the epsilon statistic to assess the differences in effectiveness of  the three 
controls (see Jiang et al., 2012). While Z-tests were used to test the significant difference 
between the path estimates (Clogg et al., 1995), the epsilon statistic was used to compute 
the relative weight of  each type of  control in order to calculate the proportion of  total 
variance explained by each control (Johnson, 2000).
RESULTS
Organizational Controls and Performance
We first tested the main effects of organizational controls on performance. Table II 
shows the results for Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c, and indicates that the three organiza-
tional controls and performance are positively related. Specifically, the estimates for 
outcome (rc = 0.24; CI95% = 0.19-0.29), behaviour (rc = 0.26; CI95% = 0.23-0.30), and 
clan control (rc = 0.32; CI95% = 0.26-0.38) are all positively significant.
We also performed statistical tests for publication bias (see Table II). The fail-safe es-
timates suggest that it would take 32,457, 40,076, and 23,169 additional studies with 
insignificant results to potentially reduce the effect sizes obtained to null values (Hunter 
and Schmidt, 2004). The results of  the trim and fill procedure indicate that there is no 
evidence of  publication bias as no studies are missing for various controls–performance 
relationships (Duval and Tweedie, 2000a 2000b). The Egger rank correlation test also 
did not show any indication of  bias in the data (Egger et al., 1997). Overall, the results of 
publication bias tests indicate that the effect sizes obtained for the three controls–perfor-
mance relationships are robust to these tests.
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The heterogeneity tests for the relationships between three controls and performance 
suggest true heterogeneity between samples. The values of  the Q statistic are all signifi-
cantly different from zero (p < 0.001), and high values of  the I2 statistic indicate that the 
effects have substantial heterogeneity. Taken together, these findings imply that additional 
contextual factors are at play that influence the size of  the correlations and explain the 
heterogeneity (Hedges and Olkin, 1985). Our supplementary analyses discussed below 
explore this heterogeneity in more detail.
Organizational Controls: Substitutes or Complements?
Table III presents the meta-analytic correlations matrix employed in our path analysis. 
Figure 2 shows the results. The overall measurement model has a good fit to the data. The 
fit indices of the model are χ2 (4) = 135.03, p < .001; CFI = 0.98; TLI = 0.95; AGFI = 0.98; 
RMSEA = 0.06; and SRMR = 0.03. The results in Figure 2 show that outcome and be-
haviour control (rc = 0.53, 95% C.I. = 0.51-0.55), behaviour and clan control (rc = 0.42, 
95%C.I. = 0.40-0.44), and outcome and clan control (rc = 0.37, 95%C.I. = 0.34-0.39) are 
all positively correlated. The results also indicate that the control variable firm size is 
not significantly related to performance (rc = −0.01, 95%C.I. = −0.02-0.01).
Furthermore, the path estimates for the direct paths from outcome, behaviour, and 
clan control to performance are all positive (0.10, 0.10, and 0.23 respectively). As such, 
the three types of  control impact performance directly but also indirectly, through 
their strengthening effect on one another. For instance, the indirect effect of  outcome 
control on performance through behaviour and clan control is 0.134 (= 0.53*0.10 + 
0.37*0.22), and therefore the total effect of  outcome control is 0.234 (=0.10 + 0.134), 
which is greater than its direct path estimate (0.10). Controls will function as com-
plements when the total effect of  one type of  control on performance is greater than 
the direct effect of  that control on performance (see Cao and Lumineau, 2015). As 
such, we can infer that performance is improved because behaviour and clan control 
complement outcome control. Similarly, the total effect for behaviour control is 0.245 
(=0.10 + 0.53*0.10 + 0.42*0.22) and clan control is 0.299 (=0.22 + 0.37*0.10 + 0.42
*0.10), and that is greater than their individual direct path estimates (0.10 and 0.23 
Table III. Meta-analytic correlation matrixa
Outcome control Behaviour control Clan control Performance Firm size
Outcome Control 1.00 76 (15924) 50 (8943) 91 (19038) 25 (3938)
Behaviour Control 0.53*** 1.00 44 (7739) 97 (19703) 27 (4507)
Clan Control 0.37*** 0.42*** 1.00 58 (10060) 22 (3483)
Performance 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.32*** 1.00 32 (5127)
Firm Size 0.05 0.07** 0.05 0.02 1.00
aCells below the diagonal contain sample size and reliability-corrected correlation mean correlations. Cells above the 
diagonal contain the number of samples (k) and the total number of observations in parentheses (N ). * p < 0.05, ** 
p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Harmonic mean = 9253.
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respectively). Hence, Hypothesis 2a is not supported, but Hypothesis 2b is supported. 
Outcome, behaviour, and clan control function as complements.
Supplementary Analyses
We assessed the differential effects of organizational controls on distinct types of per-
formance outcome to determine whether other potential moderators explain the het-
erogeneity in the effect size distribution. To estimate the differential effects of outcome, 
behaviour, and clan controls, we performed four path analyses for the rational goal, 
adaptability, human relations, and process outcomes. As shown in Table IV, most or-
ganizational controls have positive significant effects on the four types of performance 
outcome. Only for the process outcomes is the effect of outcome control significantly 
negative (β = −0.15, p < 0.001). The Z-tests show that the path estimates of clan control 
are systematically and significantly larger than the path estimates of outcome and be-
haviour control for each type of performance outcome. The results also indicate that 
the path estimates of outcome and behaviour control for rational goal outcomes and 
human-relations outcomes are not significantly different. However, the path estimates 
of behaviour control are significantly stronger than those of outcome control for adapt-
ability (Z-value = 5.15, p < 0.01) and process outcomes (Z-value = 15.90, p < 0.01). In 
addition, we analysed the complementarity and substitution among the three controls 
for the four types of performance outcome using the path analysis procedure outlined 
for testing Hypotheses 2a and 2b. The analysis indicates that the three controls are 
positively correlated to each other and the correlation values among them remain the 
same as shown in Figure 2. The path estimates for the direct effect of each control 
on rational goal, adaptability, human relations, and process outcomes are same as the 
Figure 2. Results of the meta-analytic path analysis 
Number outside parentheses represent path coefficients, numbers in parentheses represent the lower and 
upper bounds for the 95% confidence interval for path coefficients. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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standardized coefficients shown in Table IV. When we calculate the total effects of each 
type of control on each of the four types of performance outcome, the results reveal 
that the total effects of each control is greater than its direct effect. Even though the 
direct effect of outcome control on process outcomes is negative (−0.15), the total effect 
of outcome control on process outcomes is positive (0.103), as the indirect effect is 0.253 
(=0.53*0.25 + 0.37*0.32) and that is greater than −0.15. Therefore, outcome, behaviour, 
and clan control complement each other to improve each type of performance outcome.
We also assessed the influence of  the nature of  the performance data (self-reported versus 
archival), the organizational setting (intra-organizational versus inter-organizational), task 
type (NPD, IS development, sales, and HRM), level of  analysis (firm, business unit, proj-
ect team and individual), and type of  performance outcome (rational goal, adaptability, 
human relations, and process outcomes). Table V reports the results of  these analyses. We 
found no significant effect for the nature of  the performance data, which implies that the 
correlations reported in studies that use self-reported performance data are not positively or 
negatively biased compared to studies that use archival performance data. Also, the strength 
of  the association among the organizational controls and performance does not differ sig-
nificantly between intra-organizational and inter-organizational settings. The results also 
show that the outcome control–performance relationship and the clan control–performance 
relationship do not differ significantly for different task types. However, for behaviour con-
trol the analysis does support the notion that there are significant differences among the 
various subgroups of  task type (QM = 9.21, p < 0.05). To assess whether the estimates of 
the behaviour control–performance relationship for various task types are different from 
each other, we applied a Wald-type test (Viechtbauer, 2010). The analyses reveal that the 
behaviour control–performance relationship is significantly stronger for IS development 
tasks (rc = 0.30, 95%CI = 0.20-0.40) and sales tasks (rc = 0.29, 95%CI = 0.24-0.35) than for 
NPD tasks (rc = 0.11, 95%CI = −0.08-0.29) and HRM tasks (rc = 0.12, 95%CI = 0.04-0.20). 
Further, the results indicate that neither the level of  analysis, nor the type of  performance 
outcome, play a significant role in explaining the heterogeneity in effect sizes.
Finally, although we do not have a theoretical reason to expect performance to influ-
ence organizational controls, we calculated the estimates for three control–performance 
relationships from studies that employ longitudinal data in order to ascertain causality. 
The results suggest that reverse causality is not likely to be in play as the estimates for 
outcome (rc = 0.20, 95%CI = 0.06-0.34), behaviour (rc = 0.29, 95%CI = 0.11-0.46), and 
clan control (rc = 0.30, 95%CI = 0.16-0.43) are all positively significant.
DISCUSSION
This meta-analytic study had two primary objectives: (a) to investigate the bivariate 
relationship between the three organizational controls (outcome, behaviour, and clan) 
and performance, and (b) to assess whether the three controls increase (complement) 
or decrease (substitute) one another's performance effects. By analysing data obtained 
from 120 independent samples comprising 23,839 organizational control–performance 
relationships, we demonstrate that organizational controls generally have a positive as-
sociation with performance and they act as complements. Our analysis indicate that the 
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Table V. Supplementary analyses: Organizational setting, task type, level of analysis and types of 
performance outcome
Variable k N r rc SE CI95% QM QE
Performance Data
Outcome Control
Self-reported 82 15663 0.20*** 0.25*** 0.03 0.20 0.30 0.25 977.72***
Archival 7 681 0.11 0.14 0.11 −0.07 0.33
Behaviour Control
Self-reported 88 16329 0.22*** 0.27*** 0.02 0.23 0.31 1.52 628.14***
Archival 8 756 0.21*** 0.25** 0.08 0.10 0.39
Clan Control
Self-reported 53 9452 0.26*** 0.33*** 0.04 0.26 0.39 0.24 679.70***
Archival 5 608 0.22*** 0.26*** 0.08 0.11 0.40
Organizational Setting
Outcome Control
Intra-organizational 59 13151 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.03 0.18 0.28 1.63 905.85***
Inter-organizational 25 3916 0.24*** 0.30*** 0.07 0.18 0.42
Behaviour Control
Intra-organizational 67 13631 0.21*** 0.26*** 0.03 0.21 0.30 2.44 826.70***
Inter-organizational 24 3617 0.27*** 0.33*** 0.05 0.24 0.42
Clan Control
Intra-organizational 33 5539 0.25*** 0.30*** 0.04 0.23 0.37 1.52 459.54***
Inter-organizational 18 2816 0.30*** 0.38*** 0.06 0.27 0.48
Task Type
Outcome Control
NPD 13 2835 0.19** 0.24* 0.10 0.05 0.41 2.59 797.29***
IS Development 19 2114 0.25*** 0.30*** 0.06 0.19 0.40
Sales 36 8845 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.04 0.14 0.28
HRM 5 1111 0.10* 0.12 0.07 −0.01 0.25
Behaviour Control
NPD 8 1454 0.10 0.11 0.10 −0.08 0.29 9.21* 650.92***
IS Development 16 1675 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.05 0.20 0.40
Sales 47 10289 0.24*** 0.29*** 0.03 0.24 0.35
HRM 5 1111 0.11*** 0.12** 0.04 0.05 0.20
Clan Control
NPD 8 1605 0.27*** 0.34*** 0.09 0.18 0.48 1.82 365.41***
IS Development 14 1548 0.22*** 0.27*** 0.06 0.15 0.38
Sales 16 2781 0.26*** 0.33*** 0.06 0.22 0.44
HRM 5 1111 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.05 0.13 0.31
(Continued )
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Variable k N r rc SE CI95% QM QE
Level of Analysis
Outcome Control
Firm 44 11881 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.04 0.18 0.31 4.14 947.29
Business Unit 11 1696 0.10* 0.13* 0.06 0.02 0.24
Project Team 25 2794 0.24*** 0.30*** 0.06 0.08 0.41
Individual 14 2498 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.04 0.12 0.29
Behaviour Control
Firm 42 10594 0.21*** 0.26*** 0.04 0.20 0.33 2.42 885.09***
Business Unit 24 3654 0.23*** 0.29*** 0.04 0.22 0.35
Project Team 20 2030 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.06 0.10 0.33
Individual 24 3971 0.26*** 0.31*** 0.04 0.25 0.38
Clan Control
Firm 30 5726 0.30*** 0.38*** 0.05 0.29 0.46 5.97 594.24***
Business Unit 3 495 0.13 0.15 0.08 −0.00 0.29
Project Team 18 2092 0.25*** 0.30*** 0.06 0.20 0.40
Individual 7 1225 0.14 0.17 0.11 −0.04 0.37
Types of Performance Outcome
Outcome Control
Rational Goal 77 15611 0.20*** 0.25*** 0.01 0.19 0.30 1.87 1187.54***
Adaptability 20 4898 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.02 0.13 0.33
Process 6 942 0.10 0.11 0.03 −0.07 0.29
Human Relations 9 1733 0.22** 0.27* 0.05 0.06 0.45
Behaviour Control
Rational Goal 84 16980 0.21*** 0.25*** 0.01 0.21 0.29 1.72 960.31***
Adaptability 18 4120 0.24*** 0.30*** 0.02 0.20 0.40
Process 5 766 0.21 0.27 0.08 −0.02 0.51
Human Relations 11 2028 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.03 0.16 0.43
Clan Control
Rational Goal 51 8528 0.25*** 0.31*** 0.01 0.24 0.37 7.04 977.38***
Adaptability 12 2684 0.27*** 0.34*** 0.04 0.19 0.48
Process 4 646 0.40* 0.48* 0.21 0.04 0.77
Human Relations 6 955 0.44*** 0.54*** 0.09 0.29 0.72
k = number of effect sizes; N = total sample size; r = sample-size-weighted correlation; rc = sample-size-weighted cor-
relation corrected for unreliability; SE = standard error of rc; CI95% = confidence interval; QM, Q statistic for overall 
moderator model; QE, Q statistic for residual heterogeneity. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table V. Continued
three organizational controls have differential relationships with various performance 
outcomes. In addition, moderator analyses reveal that the effectiveness of controls does 
not differ between studies that employ self-reported performance data and those that 
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use archival performance data, and also does not differ for various organizational set-
tings (intra- and inter-organizational), level of analysis (firm, business unit, project team, 
individual), and type of performance outcome (rational goal, adaptability, human rela-
tions, and process outcomes). We also found that the behaviour control–performance 
relationship is moderated by the type of task that is being controlled. Below we discuss 
the theoretical and managerial implications of these findings.
Theoretical Contributions
This study enriches the organizational controls literature in four important ways. First, a 
major contribution of this study to the controls literature is that the results show that all 
three organizational controls positively impact performance and that all are therefore im-
portant mechanisms that help organizations to achieve their objectives. The results indicate 
that controls are at least as important as other determinants of performance such as stra-
tegic resources (rc = 0.22) (Crook et al., 2008), organizational knowledge transfer (rc = 0.19) 
(van Wijk et al., 2008), and exploration (rc = 0.22) and exploitation (rc = 0.22) ( Junni et al., 
2013). These positive performance effects were found not only for controlling the firm as a 
whole, but also for controlling business units, project teams, and individual employees. As 
such, our results do not provide support for arguments made in prior research that the ef-
fectiveness of controls differs for different levels of analysis (Ouchi, 1977). We also find that 
the three organizational controls are equally effective in intra- and inter-organizational 
settings. These results therefore do not support the premise that controls are less effective in 
inter-organizational settings due to controllers having difficulty in measuring and observ-
ing controllees’ outputs and behaviours, or because controllers and controllees are less likely 
to have shared values, goals, and understanding (Tiwana, 2010; Tiwana and Keil, 2009). 
Therefore, future research should focus on gaining a more detailed understanding of how 
controllers acquire the informational and social requirements needed to exercise controls 
effectively in inter-organizational settings and at different levels of analysis.
Second, this study complements and extends recent research on the interplay among 
organizational controls (e.g., Kreutzer et al., 2015, 2016). Our results support the argument 
that controls act as complements and that each control enhances the performance effects 
of  the other controls. This suggests that each control helps in addressing the limitations of 
the other controls. For example, the ‘hands-off ’ approach of  outcome control may result in 
a disconnect between controllers and controllees, and controllees might therefore receive 
fewer inputs on the behaviours that need to be followed to improve performance (Anderson 
and Oliver, 1987; Cardinal, 2001). Complementing outcome control with clan control, for 
instance, may help to mitigate these unintended consequences. Clan control may help not 
only to develop consensus on which behaviours are considered effective for achieving the de-
sired performance, but also to facilitate interactions between controller and controllees and 
reduce or prevent a possible disconnect between them (Kirsch, 1996; Turner and Makhija, 
2006). Our results also show that the three controls function as complements for all the types 
of  performance outcomes that we considered in our study (i.e., rational goal, adaptability, 
process, and human relations). Therefore, our study provides a means for controls research 
to move beyond the traditional ‘singular view’ of  control as prescriptive (i.e., that in any 
given context, there is one approach to control that will be effective) towards a ‘holistic 
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view’ that incorporates a variety of  controls (Cardinal et al., 2004, 2017; Long et al., 2002). 
Going forward, we encourage researchers to include all three organizational controls when 
examining the effectiveness of  organizational controls and their interactions. Failure to do so 
may lead to inaccurate estimates and erroneous inferences about the effectiveness of  those 
controls that are included. In this regard, researchers can employ complementarity theory to 
investigate why a combination of  different controls is more effective than any one individual 
control used on its own (Cardinal et al., 2017; Kreutzer et al., 2016).
 The third contribution of  this study lies in the fact that it shows that while all controls 
generally have positive performance effects, the relationship between each control and per-
formance is not moderated by the type of  performance outcome but that the direct effects 
of  three controls on each type of  performance outcome differ in strength, depending partly 
on the type of  performance outcome. This suggests that each control has its own character-
istics and provides support for the notion put forward by Korsgaard et al. (2010, p. 224) that 
various controls ‘operate on the behavior of  individuals in fundamentally different ways’. 
More specifically, we find that clan control has a stronger effect on each type of  performance 
outcome than outcome and behaviour controls. This finding diverges from classic controls re-
search that emphasizes clan control as an ‘alternative control’ that is only effective when out-
comes or behaviours cannot be accurately measured or observed (Ouchi, 1979). According to 
Korsgaard et al. (2010), clan control operates through internalization of  values, norms, and 
beliefs that generally encourage intrinsic motivation, whereas outcome and behaviour con-
trols rely on behavioural contingency mechanisms that are mainly associated with extrinsic 
motivation. Previous research suggests that intrinsic motivation has greater performance con-
sequences than extrinsic rewards (Ryan and Deci, 2000a). A possible reason why clan control 
is more likely to lead to intrinsic motivation is that it comprises of  proportionately greater 
informal mechanisms than formal mechanisms. However, this notion needs further investiga-
tion. As self-determination theory (SDT) focuses on the mechanisms that regulate the intrin-
sic motivation of  individuals (Ryan and Deci, 2000a 2000b), we encourage future research 
to examine the motivational mechanisms that underlie different types of  control and to use 
SDT to explicate the behavioural and performance consequences of  these mechanisms.
The finding that behaviour and outcome controls influence adaptability and process 
outcomes to different degrees also suggests that each control operates through alternative 
mechanisms. For example, adaptability outcomes (i.e., flexibility, innovation, and learn-
ing) involve unique situations that emerge continuously over time and require rich con-
troller–controllee interactions (Cardinal et al., 2017). In this regard, behaviour control is 
more effective as it facilitates more active involvement by controllers than outcome control, 
which involves a hands-off  approach (Kreutzer et al., 2015). Process outcomes (i.e., smooth 
coordination, cooperation, and information flows) rely on consistency and effectiveness in 
existing routines and practices (Cardinal et al., 2017). Behaviour control is more effective in 
settings where process outcomes are required as it involves the specification of  standardized 
procedures, whereas in outcome control no inputs whatsoever are provided to controllees 
in terms of  the procedures that should be followed (Kirsch, 1996). To understand more 
about these different paths, we encourage future research to explore other mechanisms that 
may act as mediators of  the control–performance relationships. For example, role theory 
could be used to explore whether providing greater clarity over the processes and goals for 
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a particular task may help to increase controllees' job satisfaction, and thus lead to higher 
performance (Carbonell and Rodriguez-Escudero, 2013; Sawyer, 1992).
Fourth, this study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that the effectiveness 
of  controls depends partly on the task that is being controlled. Our results show that be-
haviour control is more effective for tasks such as IS development (Gopal and Gosain, 2010) 
or sales (Baldauf  et al., 2005) that rely on an identifiable series of  procedures and routine 
activities, than for tasks such as NPD and HRM that involve higher levels of  complexity 
and a more varied body of  expertise. In our view, these results are underpinned by the no-
tion that behaviours are dependent on the complexity involved in a particular system and 
that these behaviours can interact with controls to influence their functioning (Cardinal et 
al., 2017; McCarthy et al., 2006). This notion is also empirically supported by Liu (2015), 
who found that the behaviour control is generally effective, but that its effectiveness de-
creases due to high system complexity. Therefore, although we find that behaviour control 
is generally effective for distinct outcomes that span various tasks, the explanation for our 
finding that behaviour control is less effective for HRM and NPD tasks may lie in the fact 
that NPD and HRM can be viewed as complex systems (Colbert, 2004; McCarthy et al., 
2006). NPD and HRM tasks involve more complexity due to the fact that there is high 
task interdependence and coordination is needed because the activities are cross-functional 
(Gulati and Singh, 1998; Thompson, 1967). As such, our study suggests that the complexity 
involved in various tasks may interact with the functioning of  the control. We thus encour-
age future research to explore how systems complexity affects the effectiveness of  controls 
and also how controls function across different tasks.
Managerial Implications
Our meta-analysis suggests that managers can achieve the desired performance out-
comes by exercising outcome, behaviour, and clan controls. The results also indicate 
that managers are likely to reap the greatest benefits in terms of performance by em-
phasizing clan controls that can intrinsically motivate controllees. However, this does 
not mean that managers should ignore outcome and behaviour controls as a means of 
enhancing performance as these may motivate employees through extrinsic rewards.
Considering the various situations in which managers exercise organizational controls, 
our results also suggest that they should give equal emphasis to outcome, behaviour, and 
clan controls when exercising control in intra-organizational or inter-organizational set-
tings. Also, their choice of  control should not be dependent on whether the control is being 
exercised at the firm level, or at the business or functional unit, project team, or individual 
level. However, we also find that managers cannot take a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach across 
different types of  task. More specifically, if  they emphasize outcome and clan control man-
agers can expect similar performance effects for various types of  tasks. Further, behaviour 
control is less effective for tasks such as NPD and HRM that do not involve an identifiable 
series of  procedures and routine activities than it is for IS development and sales tasks. 
Finally, our study indicates that managerial controls are complements, and that exercising 
different types of  control simultaneously provides synergies that help in overcoming the 
limitations of  the individual controls. Instead of  relying on a single type of  control, man-
agers should appreciate the strengths and added value of  using all three types of  control.
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LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Although this study has several important implications, the results of this study should 
be considered in light of several limitations, and additional research is needed to ad-
dress these. The first limitation is that our findings are silent on the time-dependent 
performance effects of the interplay among controls. This interplay may well change 
as controller–controllee relationships evolve over time (Kirsch, 2004). Thus, the way 
in which controls interact over time remains a black box, and additional longitudinal 
studies or experimental studies are needed to develop our understanding of this aspect 
of organizational control. The second limitation is that we were only able to focus on 
three moderators as we were limited by the data available for our analysis. As evident 
in the significant Q statistics through our statistical analyses, there is still a substantial 
amount of variability in terms of the moderators to be accounted for. The organiza-
tional controls literature argues that the effectiveness of controls is also affected by the 
ability of controllers to measure outcomes, observe behaviours, and understand the 
process associated with transforming inputs into outputs (Kirsch, 1996; Ouchi, 1979). 
Investigation of outcome measurability, behaviour observability, and knowledge of the 
transformation process as additional moderators in future empirical studies will help 
in a better understanding of the organizational controls–performance relationships.7
There are at least three other areas for further research. First, building on our findings 
regarding the different types of  task, researchers may want to investigate whether it is 
better for managers to specialize in controlling one specific type of  task (e.g., to limit them-
selves to controlling only people engaged in sales activities) or whether they might become 
more effective by diversifying and gaining experience in controlling different tasks (e.g., 
controlling salespeople and new product development teams, etc.). Second, our research 
largely suggests that more control is better. However, researchers have acknowledged that 
the gains obtained from exercising various controls may be cancelled out by using more 
controls due to the high resource requirements and adverse behaviours associated with an 
increased use of  controls (e.g., Grewal et al., 2013). Thus, we encourage future research-
ers to determine what the optimal level of  controls may be in a context, how that can be 
achieved, and at what point controls become excessive. Third, in line with the suggestion 
by Cardinal et al. (2017), we encourage future studies to explore whether our results will 
hold in new types of  organizational forms and work styles such as relational networks, 
virtual teams, open innovation, and flexible working practices.
CONCLUSION
The overall objective of this study was to examine the relationship between organizational 
controls and performance. We found that outcome, behaviour, and clan controls all con-
tribute to performance but that clan control is more effective than the other two controls 
for each type of performance outcome. Our analyses also highlight that the effectiveness of 
outcome and clan controls is stable across various organizational settings, levels, and tasks 
as well as across various performance outcomes, and that it is only for behaviour control 
that the effectiveness of varies according to the type of task. This study also provides strong 
additional support for the view that one type of control increases the effectiveness of the 
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others. By combining and analysing the empirical results of many independent studies, we 
are the first to examine these factors in a systematic manner. In sum, this research opens 
up several new avenues for future research on the effectiveness of controls that should be 
explored in order to extend our understanding of organizational controls.
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Notes
[1]  The traditional controls research has discussed the three types of control as either formal or informal. 
Lately, however, scholars have argued that all three types involve both formal and informal mecha-
nisms (Cardinal et al., 2010; Kreutzer et al., 2016).
[2]  Historically, clan control has been labelled as an informal control. However, clan control has both 
formal and informal attributes as it involves selection, training, and diversity of the workforce in ad-
dition to socialization and interpersonal approaches to inf luence norms, values, and beliefs (Kirsch 
et al., 2010; Ouchi, 1979). We therefore focus on a notion of clan control that includes not only the 
role of the clan in stimulating specific controllee behaviours through unwritten and unofficial values, 
norms, and beliefs, but also the search for and selection of controllees who undergo value training to 
internalize the desired behaviours.
[3]  The different sets of studies with duplicate datasets are: (1) Challagalla and Shervani (1996, 1997); (2) 
Austrian dataset in Baldauf et al. (2002) and Baldauf et al. (2001b); (3) Miller et al. (2013), Saldanha 
et al. (2013), and Saldanha et al. (2014); (4) Flaherty et al. (2007) and Flaherty and Pappas (2012); (5) 
Piercy et al. (2009) and Piercy et al. (2012); (6) Solberg (2006b) and Solberg (2008); (7) Smets (2013) and 
Smets et al. (2013); (8) Smets (2013) and Smets et al. (2016); and (9) Yu and To (2008, 2011).
[4]  All the studies in sets 2, 3, 4, 5, and 9 (see endnote 3) were not marked as duplicate and coded sepa-
rately. The studies in sets 1, 6, 7, and 8 (also endnote 3) were marked as duplicate. We kept Challagalla 
and Shervani (1996) and Solberg (2006b), but dropped Challagalla and Shervani (1997) and Solberg 
(2008) as they were published later. Concerning the PhD dissertation by Smets (2013), we dropped 
this dissertation as the two studies (i.e., Smets et al. (2013, 2016)) from this have since been published.
[5]  The formula for Perreault and Leigh's reliability index is represented by Ir = {[(F/N) – (1/k)][k/(k–1)]} 
0.5, for F/N > 1/k; where F is the frequency of agreement between coders, N is the total number of 
judgments, and k is the number of categories (the Ir values range from 0 to 1, with higher values rep-
resenting greater reliability).
[6]  According to Cao and Lumineau (2015), two methodological techniques can be used to examine the 
complementary or substitute effects between independent variables: (1) using the interaction terms for 
the independent variables in the structural model for which complementarity or substitute effects need 
to be examined (Song et al., 2005); (2) analysing the relationship between the independent variables 
and dependent variables simultaneously and examining whether the independent variables are posi-
tively or negatively related to the dependent variable (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Given that the studies 
in our sample did not report the correlation values between the interaction terms and the dependent 
variable, we employed the second method in our analysis, and we used the approach followed by Cao 
and Lumineau (2015) in their meta-analytic study.
[7] We want to thank one of the reviewers for drawing our attention to this issue.
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